We consider a model in which the agent faces two independent risks of loss with different probabilities of occurrence and (possibly) different levels of potential loss. We show that it is optimal to select a deductible for the low probability event that is not larger than the optimal deductible for the other risk. This result holds for any preference functional that satisfies the second-order stochastic dominance property. It tends to support the view that insurance is the most appropriate risk management tool for low-frequency risks. When the expected loss is the same for the two risks, i.e. when the low probability event is also "catastrophic," it is never optimal not to insure the catastrophic risk when some insurance is purchased for the other risk.
INTRODUCTION
When an individual faces a single source of risk, the optimal insurance contract contains full insurance above a deductible when the premium only depends upon the actuarial value of the contract. This result was established not only under expected utility (Arrow 1965; Raviv 1968) but also for any non-expected utility framework that satisfies the second order stochastic dominance (SSD) property (see Machina 1995) . Besides Gollier and Schlesinger (1996) have shown that the superiority of the deductible policy results from its better ability to reduce the variability of final wealth for a given cost of insurance. More specifically they prove that any insurance contract of equal cost will be dominated, in the second order sense, by one with a deductible policy.
Although this result turned out to be very important in many respects, its practical relevance is limited by the assumption that there is only one source of uncertainty. In practice, people and firms face many simultaneous sources of risk and they have to decide both on the amount of their total insurance budget and on its allocation among the different sources of risk. Recently, Gollier and Schlesinger (1995) showed that people would like to cover multiple risks by purchasing an "umbrella" contract covering all risks at the same time, with full insurance above a deductible on the aggregate loss. Unfortunately, such an 18 umbrella contract is rarely offered in reality. As a consequence, decision-makers have to consider the optimal level of coverage for each risk separately. In this context, Gollier and Schlesinger prove that it is optimal to purchase contracts with full insurance above a deductible for each peril.
In this paper, we extend all these results by considering rules that should be followed in choosing the deductible level for each risk in terms of its characteristics. To be more specific, we consider an individual who faces two pure risks, x 1 and x 2 which differ both in terms of the probability of the loss occurrence (p 1 and p 2 ) and in terms of the level of potential loss (L 1 and L 2 , respectively).
1 For instance, χ 1 might be a low frequency risk (p 1 low, e.g. and earthquake risk or the risk of cancer in the year to come for a young healthy individual) with a high potential loss (L 1 ). On the contrary, χ 2 may stand for a risk likely to materialize (p 2 is high) but with moderate or mild severity (L 2 is not too large). Given that insurance is offered separately for each risk, how should the optimal deductibles (D 1 * and D 2 * ) compare to each other? Intuition suggests that one should cut down the large losses and select deductible levels so that the net loss (the loss minus the indemnity) should be equal for each risk. After all, the Arrow's deductible result suggests that it is optimal not to indemnify any loss below a limit that is the same for any source of risk affecting the wealth of the insured person. If this extension of the Arrow's result were correct, one would select equal levels of deductible for each risk. In this paper we show that such a policy is not, in general, optimal despite it's a priori intuitive appeal.
Reducing the deductible has two contradictory effects on expected utility. First, it increases the premium. Second, it increases the indemnity in case of loss. It is a priori not clear how a change in the probability of loss affects the optimal deductible which is a best compromise between these two adverse effects. In fact, in most cases, a strong "probability effect" will be at work inducing the individual to choose low deductibles (hence, high coverage) for those risks that are very unlikely. Hence, our paper tends to support the sometimes held view that insurance is the most appropriate risk management tool for low frequency risks. It is important to observe that this result is not driven only by the fact that the price per dollar of coverage is proportional to the probability of loss. Indeed, a lower probability also makes the indemnification less likely to occur. The effect on the desirability of coverage is thus a priori ambiguous. We present our model and our main result in the next section. In the following section, we provide an additional property of the solution under expected utility, whereas the penultimate section is devoted to the case of Yaari's dual theory. Eu w x x + + 0 5, where x 1 dominates x 2 in the sense of FSD. In that case, αi is the rate of retention for risk x i i. This has the advantage of not assuming a two-point distribution as we do in this paper. But this makes the problem much more difficult to solve. We are not aware of any result about this more general model. The closest reference is Hadar and Seo (1990) , but they have only one decision variable.
THE GENERAL MODEL
An agent faces two independent risks of loss, x 1 and x 2 . Risk i has a distribution (0, 1 -p i , L i , p i ), i.e. it yields a loss L i > 0 with probability p i . We assume that p 1 is less than p 2 . An interesting special case is when the two risks have the same expectation
In this case, x 1 is riskier than x 2 in the sense of second-order stochastic dominance. Insurers provide separate contracts for each risk. A contract for risk i stipulates a straight deductible D i in case of loss, i.e. the indemnity in case of loss is L i -D i . We assume that the insurance tariff is proportional to the actuarial value of policies. The loading factor 8 > 1 is the same on both markets. We conclude that a contract on risk i with a deductible D i yields a premium
The final wealth of an agent who selects a couple (D 1 , D 2 ) of deductibles for the two risks is ~( , )
, where w 0 is initial wealth and P(D 1 , D 2 ) = P 1 (D 1 ) + P 2 (D 2 ) is the insurance budget. The agent solves the following problem:
where G is some preference functional. We hereafter assume that G exhibits global second-order stochastic dominance preference. This means that the agent dislikes any second-order stochastic deterioration in the distribution of final wealth. If G is an expected utility functional, this is equivalent to the utility function being increasing and concave. To make the problem interesting, we exclude the case of fair insurance (8 = 1), for which optimal insurance is full insurance for both risks 1 61 6 1 6 1 6
Note that increasing D 1 above D, as in Figure 1 , shifts the probability mass to the left from z -2D to z -D 1 -D 2 by a distance equals to (1 -p 1 /p 2 ) k > 0. At the same time, it moves probability mass to the left from z -D to z -D 1 by a distance equaling k. Finally, it moves probability mass to the right from z -D to z -D 1 by a distance equaling (p 1 /p 2 ) k. The combination of these shifts of probability masses does not change the mean. Since all of the leftward (respectively rightward) shifts of probability mass lie below (respectively above) wealth level z -D, it is apparent that they represent a mean-preserving increase in risk. ϖ
An important implication of this proof is that increasing D 1 and reducing D 2 from D 1 = D 2 = D to maintain the total insurance budget has two effects. First, it increases the retained loss when two accidents occur. Indeed, because of the fact that p 1 is less than p 2 , a one dollar increase of the deductible D 1 saves 8p 1 on the insurance budget. This can be used to reduce deductible D 2 by (p 2 /p 1 ) > 1. Thus, the retained loss when both risks generate a loss is increased by (p 2 -p 1 )/p 1 > 0. This is compensated by a reduction of the expected retained loss conditional on incurring only one loss. This first mean-preserving spread is depicted by the two arrows indexed "A" in Figure 1 . Second, there is a mean-preserving spread (indexed "B" in the figure) of the retained loss conditional on incurring only one loss. Indeed, the retained loss is D for sure if D 1 = D 2 = D, whereas it is D 1 or D 2 after the change in the deductible. 
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A direct consequence of the Lemma is that no agent with a preference ordering satisfying the SSD criterion would select a strategy yielding a larger deductible for the low probability event. This is due to the fact that this strategy is dominated by an equal-deductible strategy, whatever his insurance budget is. This is true in particular for the optimal insurance budget. So, the fixed budget that we use in the remaining of the paper is just to make the analysis simpler. This is in no way an assumption. 
it is optimal to purchase some insurance for the catastrophic risk. This concludes the proof. ϖ
In the following two sections, we provide additional insights by considering more specific preference functionals. We focus on whether D 1 * should be equal to D 2 * or not.
THE CASE OF EXPECTED UTILITY
Analysis of the Optimal Insurance Strategy
We assume in this section that the agent is an expected-utility maximizer with utility function u that is differentiable, increasing and concave. In short, we have G w Eu w1 6 1 6 = . We know that this specification for G satisfies the second-order stochastic dominance property.
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Let us analyze the effect on the distribution of final wealth of departing from the strategy D 1 = D 2 = D by reducing D 1 and increasing D 2 to maintain an unchanged insurance budget. This is done in Figure 2 . As before, we decompose the global effect into two components. The first component is a mean-preserving contraction represented by arrows "A." The proposed strategy reduces the retained loss in the worst case (x 1 = L 1 and x 2 = L 2 ) and it increases the expected retained loss conditional to only one loss occurring. This is a beneficial effect. The second effect is a mean-preserving spread represented by arrows "B" in Figure 2 : departing from the equal-deductible strategy makes the retained loss, conditional on only one loss being incurred, riskier. Since the two effects are conflicting it appears a priori that some risk averse agents would prefer to stay at D 1 = D 2 = D. This is not true, as shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 2: If the insured person is an expected-utility maximizer with a differentiable utility function, then D
Proof: Let P * denote the optimal insurance budget. Strategies (D 1 , D 2 ) that yield the same insurance budget satisfy the following condition:
The agent who selects D 1 in this set would end up with expected utility 
THE CASE OF YAARI'S "DUAL THEORY"
Under expected utility, we obtained that p 1 < p 2 implies that D 1 * must be strictly smaller than D 2 * . To test for the robustness of this result we now consider an alternative decision rule (namely Yaari's dual theory (D.T.)) that also satisfies the SSD criterion while relying on axioms that are, for some of them, very different from those at the root of expected utility (E.U.). The optimal insurance coverage with Yaari's preferences has been examined by Doherty and Eeckhoudt (1995) in the case of a single insurable risk. They showed that it follows a sort of "bangbang" strategy, with either no insurance or full insurance being optimal.
As is well known, E.U. assigns a value to a project by taking a transformed expectation that is linear in probabilities and non-linear in wealth while D.T. does just the opposite. In D.T., the probability weight associated to any event depends on the relative level of final wealth corresponding to that event. This is the reason why it is important in D.T. to rank all the possible outcomes of a lottery to apply Yaari's model. In our case, given an insurance budget P = P(D 1 , D 2 ), final wealth ϕ can take four values: . This was due to the fact that E.U. generates second-degree risk aversion. In the Dual Theory, risk aversion is of the first-degree type. This yields the result that the two deductibles may, but need not, be the same. This difference in optimal decisions obtained respectively for E.U. and D.T. provides a test to discriminate between them.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we have shown that an insurance budget should be allocated among many sources of risk according to the probability of loss-occurrence that characterizes each risk. Under very general conditions (i.e., the S.S.D. criterion), the optimal deductible for the low frequency risk ( . This result confirms the practice usually adopted by industrial risk managers who stress the relative efficiency of insurance as a protection device for low probability events with potential large losses.
